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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) becomes a g reater threat when 
accompanied by the proliferation of effective means of delivery. Proliferator nations are acquir-
ing the means of delivery—most dramatically, ballistic missiles.
Defenses against ballistic missiles are accepted instruments for dealing with missile pro-
liferation. Such defenses can help protect friends and allies from missile attack. The prospect of 
such protection can reduce the incentive for potential proliferators to acquire WMD and their 
ballistic missile delivery systems. Once proliferation has occurred, missile defenses can reduce 
the expected effects of proliferators’ forces and thus help deter aggression.
These benefits will be lost, or at least reduced, if proliferators can acquire effective coun-
termeasures against missile defenses. Such countermeasures, when incorporated in an attack-
er’s missile, are known as penetration aids, referred to here as penaids. The subject of this docu-
mented briefing is an approach to hindering the proliferation of penaids. 
This documented briefing was prepared in 2012–2013 under the Naval Postgraduate 
School research task “Penaid Nonproliferation: New Measures to Dissuade WMD Prolifera-
tion and Reinforce Deterrence.” It should be of interest to individuals and organizations con-
cerned with missile defense and with missile and WMD nonproliferation.
This research was sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and conducted 
within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense 
Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the 
Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.
 For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see 
http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information 
is provided on the web page).
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This research describes an approach to hindering the spread of countermeasures against bal-
listic missile defenses. (Such countermeasures, when incorporated in an attacker’s missile, are 
also called penetration aids, or penaids.) The approach involved compiling an unclassified list 
of penaid-relevant items that might be subject to internationally agreed-upon export controls.
The list is formatted to fit into the export-control structure of current international policy 
against the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. This 
policy, the Missile Technology Control Regime, creates two levels of control. One is a set of 
tight restrictions against a small number of items, such as complete missiles or their major 
subsystems. The other is a set of case-by-case export reviews for lower-level components and 
dual-use items.
This report recommends controls on 19 penaid-relevant items. More specifically, it rec-
ommends the tightest controls on three of those items: complete, integrated countermeasure 
subsystems; complete subsystems for missile defense test targets; and boost-glide vehicles. It 
offers as candidates for the tightest controls ten other items, such as re-entry vehicle replicas or 
decoys. But because these ten items are not complete subsystems, it identifies the possibility of 
treating them to a case-by-case review to improve the negotiability of the controls. Finally, the 
report identifies six classes of items, including test facilities and equipment, that could appro-






Sponsors and Interviews 
•  Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
•  Naval Postgraduate School, Project on Advanced 
Systems and Concepts for Combating WMD  
•  Agencies and contractors interviewed 
 
•  OSD •  deciBel Research 
•  DoS •  SMDC 
•  DoC •  MSIC 
•  MDA •  ODNI 
•  DTSA •  CIA 
•  MIT Lincoln Lab •  NASIC 
•  Vision Centric Inc. •  Sandia Lab 
•  Gomez Research •  Bruce Haselman 
1 
Th e funds for this research were provided by the Defense Th reat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 
and administered by the Naval Postgraduate School. Special recognition goes to David Hamon, 
formerly of DTRA, Anne Clunan of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced 
Systems and Concepts for Combating WMD, and Meghan Rasmussen, also at the Naval Post-
graduate School, for making this project a reality.
More than three dozen individuals from the organizations listed in slide 1 provided guid-
ance for this research. Th e organizations were the Offi  ce of the Secretary of Defense, the 
U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Missile Defense Agency, 
the Defense Technology Security Administration, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s 
(MIT’s) Lincoln Laboratory, Vision Centric Inc., Gomez Research, deciBel Research, the U.S. 
Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center, the 
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Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Air 
Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Sandia 
Laboratory, and the individual Bruce Haselman. 
Individuals from more than half of the participating organizations attended a July 25, 
2012, workshop at RAND to review and comment on preliminary findings. With the work-
shop comments in hand, the authors made extensive revisions and expansions to a draft of 
this report. Particular credit is due to Allen Dors at MIT’s Lincoln Lab and Brian Chow at 
RAND for their insightful reviews of multiple drafts. However, this report reflects the views 




Research Objective   
Assist U.S. agencies in hindering the spread of 
countermeasures against ballistic missile defenses by 
developing an unclassified list of penaid-relevant items that 
might be subject to internationally agreed-upon export 
controls 
2 
Th is research was designed to assist U.S. agencies charged with generating policies to discour-
age the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile delivery sys-
tems, thereby strengthening deterrence. Th e objective was to develop new measures to restrict 
the proliferation of countermeasures (also known, when incorporated in an attacker’s missile, 
as penetration aids, or penaids) against ballistic missile defenses. It is necessary to identify 
the science and technology underpinning the development of penaids before policies can be 
designed to control the threat. Th erefore, the study team focused on answering the following 
overarching research question: What technologies and equipment, if proliferated, would con-
stitute an emerging penaid threat to the United States? 
Th e scope was limited to countermeasures against ballistic missile defenses. Countermea-
sures against cruise missile defenses involve substantially diff erent technologies and will be 
investigated in a future study.
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3  /2010!
Research Method 
Conduct a literature review, interviews, a technical 
assessment, and a subject-matter expert workshop to 
generate a list of penaid-relevant items that might be 
subject to internationally agreed-upon export controls  
 
3 
Th e RAND National Defense Research Institute drew on its expertise in the several subjects 
relevant to the project: U.S. ballistic missile defense systems; domestic and foreign development 
of penetration aids and related technology and equipment; relevant U.S. aerospace systems, 
technologies, and industry; and related proliferation/nonproliferation matters. RAND analysts 
conducted a literature review and interviews to identify data sources and leading government 
and nongovernment experts on subjects relevant to the project. Th e study team conducted 
structured interviews and an independent technical assessment to develop a preliminary char-
acterization of the technologies and equipment most critical to the emerging penaid threat. 
Th ereafter, the team invited a selected group of experts to participate in a one-day workshop to 
review the initial characterization of penaid technologies and equipment.
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Findings by a Congressional Commission 
“The United States should . . . develop effective capabilities 
to defend against increasingly complex missile threats . . . 
[which] include technologies intended to help in-coming 
missiles penetrate the defense (so-called penetration aids).  
. . . The United States should also work with Russia and 






Source: Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (known as the Perry/Schlesinger Commission), 
America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, May 2009, http://media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf. 
4 
Th e project was suggested in 2009 by a commission chartered by Congress and headed by two 
former Secretaries of Defense. Th e commission recommended a focus on technology transfers 
from Russia and China—an approach referenced in slide 4 and consistent with the broader 
international scope developed here.
In fact, the commission’s report represented a turning point in interest in penaid nonpro-
liferation. According to the recollection of a RAND study team member, when international 
missile nonproliferation controls were being designed in 1982–1983, the U.S. participants 
considered including controls on penetration aids. However, doing so would have required 
bringing in additional expertise, complicating the international discussions, and it would have 
addressed a problem that was likely to be decades away. Th us, the matter was deferred.
Th e issue arose again almost two decades later—in a 2000 contractor study for the Offi  ce 
of the Secretary of Defense (see McMahon, Orman, and Speier, 2000). However, Missile 
Defense Agency concerns deferred action on the matter again.
In 2007, one of the authors of this RAND report published an article on penaid nonpro-
liferation (see Speier, 2007). Th e article recommended export-control modifi cations similar to 
those discussed here. However, the article was based on a more limited fi eld of interviews and 
lacked the benefi t of the 2012 RAND workshop, which brought together experts to comment 
on each others’ positions and, consequently, to modify them. Th e 2007 report did not include 
some of the most important items recommended here for the tightest export controls, it formu-
lated items diff erently from the more operationally appropriate descriptions here, and it did not 
fi t into the structure of export controls as closely as the suggestions in this report.
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Soon after the 2009 report of the congressional commission, the Defense Threat Reduc-
tion Agency (DTRA) began discussions with RAND that led to the research described here.
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Policy Refinements to the Objective 
•  Fullest possible list 
•  MTCR format 
•  Technology, not policy 
•  Be specific or be general 
•  Avoid “specially designed” 
5 
Interviewees for this research suggested several refi nements to the control list. One was to 
develop a broad list of penaid-related items from which the most important might later be 
selected. 
Another was to put these items in the format of the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR), the international instrument for hindering the spread of WMD-capable missiles. 
Th e MTCR Annex is a control list of items presented in a format usable by government export-
control offi  cials (see MTCR, 2012).
A third suggestion was to focus exclusively on penaid-relevant technology, not on policy 
questions. Th is was easier said than done, however, because—as discussed later—the place-
ment of items on the MTCR Annex determines the degree to which the export of such items 
will be restricted. Some interviewees advised the RAND researchers that it would help export 
control and customs offi  cials if they were as specifi c as possible in identifying candidate items 
for controls. Others suggested a more general approach to avoid unintended information trans-
fer to proliferators. As a result, the study team had to choose an approach that would take into 
account both requests.
Finally, the international export control community is attempting to minimize the use of 
the term specially designed in identifying items to be controlled. Th e MTCR defi nes the term 
as follows: 
“Specially Designed” describes equipment, parts, components or software which, as a result 
of “development,” have unique properties that distinguish them for certain predetermined 
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purposes. For example, a piece of equipment that is “specially designed” for use in a missile 
will only be considered so if it has no other function or use. Similarly, a piece of manu-
facturing equipment that is “specially designed” to produce a certain type of component 
will only be considered as such if it is not capable of producing other types of components. 
(MTCR, 2012, p. 15)
The international export control community’s concern is that the term specially designed 
describes intent rather than the physical features of a controlled item. However, in some cases, 
RAND researchers found no alternative for the phrase.
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Penaids: There’s a Lot Out There 
Source: Google. 
6 
Th ere is a great deal of openly available information on penaids. Entering “penetration aids” 
(in quotes) in the Google search engine yields thousands of hits with hundreds of nonrepeating 
hits. “Penaids,” a more colloquial term, is also well represented online.
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7  /2010!
Penaids: There’s a Lot Out There (Cont’d) 
Source: “Penetration Aid,” Wikipedia, last updated March 17, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penetration_aid  
(photo by Chris Gibson).  
7 
Th e fi rst Google hit is a Wikipedia reference that displays an entire countermeasure sub-
system, the British Chevaline Penetration Aid Carrier, as depicted in slide 7.
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Penaids: Controls Will Help 
•  Penaids ought to be 
–  Matched to the defensive system 
–  Integrated with the offensive system 
–  Able to function in space and/or re-entry 
–  Flight-tested with appropriate data collection 
•  Limited suppliers able to meet these criteria 
•  Without external assistance, development entails 
significant additional cost and time 
•  Missile performance may suffer 
8 
In spite of the wide range of publicly available information on penaids, there is hope for the 
eff ectiveness of export controls. Th is is because, to be reliable, penaids must meet several dif-
fi cult criteria:
• Th ey must be matched to the defensive system they are intended to penetrate—meaning 
that details of the defensive system must be known and understood.
• Th ey take volume, weight, and power away from the payload of the off ensive system and 
must not interfere with the missile’s functions or reliability—meaning that sophisticated 
systems engineering must integrate penaids with the rest of the payload.
• Th ey must be able to survive the launch environment and function in their intended 
operational environment, i.e., space and in some cases re-entry—another engineering 
challenge. 
• To be reliable, penaids must be tested in space and, in some cases, re-entry with appro-
priate instrumentation—a more diffi  cult challenge than merely observing the arrival of a 
re-entry vehicle in a target area. 
Th ere are few suppliers who can help proliferators meet all these criteria. As noted earlier, 
a congressional commission identifi ed Russia and China as key potential suppliers. Russia is a 
full participant in the MTCR. China is not, but it maintains that it adheres to an early version 
of the MTCR.
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Without external assistance, penaid development can be costly and time-consuming. In 
the 1960s, the United States reportedly spent $300–400 million per year on penaid research 
and development (Sessler et al., 2000). The British Chevaline program, conducted largely 
during the 1970s with limited U.S. assistance, cost more than £1 billion and took more than 
a decade for research, development, and entry into service (Dommett, 2008; Jones, 2005; 
Panton, 2004a, 2004b, 2006). 
The weight and other physical demands of penaids can reduce missile performance—
more so if external assistance is limited. For example, the British Polaris missiles reportedly suf-
fered range and payload penalties as a result of being equipped with the Chevaline subsystem 
(see “Chevaline,” 2013; Simpson, 2004). 
Recent reports by the U.S. Government Accountability Office describe difficulties with 
U.S. missile defense test targets, which contain penaid-like technology (GAO, 2008, 2011).1 
Problems with target performance have added at least $1 billion to the missile defense budget, 
and target failures and anomalies have “negatively affected many of the missile defense ele-
ments” (GAO, 2008, p. 4). A new target system, including launch vehicles, has cost more 
than $600 million for the first six targets. These costs and difficulties can be minimized with 
external assistance that provides proven penaid hardware or technology. But if such assistance 
is restricted by export controls, challenges and expenses can be expected to afflict the develop-
ment of reliable penaids.
Given the difficulty of developing reliable penaids, one might ask whether a proliferator 
would settle for the development of less reliable penaids—perhaps by not testing them in space 
or by designing them in the absence of some critical information about the defensive system. 
As noted earlier, any penaid will take volume, weight, and power away from the lethal payload. 
Consequently, there is a performance trade-off to consider, possibly in terms of a range penalty 
or a reduction of payload lethality. This penalty must be weighed against a penaid subsystem of 
uncertain value. Moreover, a penaid—if not adequately tested—may interfere with the func-
tioning of the missile system itself. These are significant considerations for a proliferator look-
ing to develop penaids at low cost but high risk.
1 See also slide 21 and surrounding text.
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General Problems with a Penaid Control List 
•  Potential tripling of MTCR Category I list 
•  Utility of some items for satellites, satellite defense, and 
missile defense itself 
•  Tension between being general or being specific 
•  Negotiability 
9 
Th ere are several broad problems with developing a list of items to be controlled.
Th e fi rst concerns the MTCR’s tight focus on a few items to be subject to the strictest 
export restrictions—the Category I list, to be discussed later. Only eight classes of such items 
are listed under Category I in the MTCR Annex. Th is study explored 19 additional items, 
potentially diff using the MTCR’s tight focus if all the items were added to Category I.
Th e second problem concerns the dual uses of many penaid-relevant items. Because they 
must function in space, some of the items are usable for satellites. And, as explained later, some 
are usable for missile defenses themselves.
We have already touched on the diffi  culty of defi ning an item with enough specifi city that 
export-control offi  cials can recognize it while retaining enough generality that the control list 
does not become a “to-do” list facilitating unintended information transfer to a proliferator.
With any international control list, international negotiability is a concern. By and large, 
the study team has deferred to the expertise of export-control offi  cials  to identify the best ways 
to address such concerns. Th is report does, however, point out alternative sites on the MTCR 
Annex for penaid-relevant items. Th e choice of a site may aff ect negotiability.
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10  /2010!
Candidates for a Control List 
•  Complete penaids 
•  Test targets 
•  Boost-glide vehicles 
•  Canisters/dispensers 
•  Post-boost subsystems 
•  Replicas/decoys 
•  Electronic  
countermeasures 
•  Chaff/obscurants 
•  RV/decoy signature control 
•  Plume signature control 
•  Wake modification 
•  Maneuvering subsystems 
•  Submunitions 
•  Multiple-object deployment 
•  Inflation/assembly items 
•  Hardening 
•  Attack warning sensors 
•  Fly-along sensors 
•  Test facilities/equipment 
10 
Th e list in slide 10 serves as a “table of contents” for this report: 19 penaid-relevant items that 
might be subject to international export controls. Before discussing each of these items indi-
vidually, we point out the key features of the MTCR that aff ect the treatment of these 19 items.
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Topics Not Addressed in This Report 
•  MTCR history 
•  Countermeasures against missile defense infrastructure 
and communications 
•  Penaid suppliers 
•  Cruise missile penaids 
11 
To keep this report focused, many related topics are not covered here.
Beyond the elements of the MTCR discussed in this report, there is a background of 
more than 25 years of successes and shortcomings. Some of this background may be found 
in the writings of Speier (1991, 1995, 2000, 2007) and in the transcript of an interview with 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation 
Vann Van Diepen (Davenport, Horner, and Kimball, 2012). 
Th is report does not examine all of the tactics that might be used to defeat missile defenses. 
It focuses on ballistic missile countermeasures that might be subject to international controls, 
i.e., countermeasures carried by missiles and potentially controlled by the MTCR.
Except in a few illustrations, this report does not discuss fi rms or governments that might 
supply penaids. As noted previously, this report does not discuss penaids for cruise missiles. 




The Missile Technology Control Regime
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How the MTCR Works 
•  Designed to prevent the proliferation of 
–  Rockets or UAVs capable of delivering a 500 kg 
payload to a range of at least 300 km 
or 
–  Any rocket or UAV intended to deliver WMD 
•  Two categories 
–  Category I – items subject to a strong presumption of 
export denial 
–  Category II – items subject to a case-by-case review 
and no-undercut rule 
•  Enforced by international cooperation and/or U.S. 
sanctions 
12 
Th e MTCR seeks to hinder the spread of rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—
regardless of purpose (e.g., space launch, surveillance)—beyond a s pecifi ed range-payload 
capability, or regardless of range-payload capability if intended to deliver WMD.
Th e MTCR’s Category I list consists of eight classes of items subject to the tightest export 
restrictions. Th e MTCR guidelines state that such exports, if they occur at all, must be “rare” 
and subject to strong provisions with respect to supplier responsibility.
Th e MTCR’s Category II list consists of items that can be used to make Category I items, 
as well as other missile items related to potential WMD delivery. However, Category II items 
are generally dual-use, applicable to purposes other than those related to Category I items. So, 
Category II exports are subject to greater fl exibility but nevertheless require case-by-case export 
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reviews and international procedures to avoid undercutting Category II denials by MTCR 
partners.
The MTCR has well-developed procedures for sharing export decision information 
among its members. The United States has legislation providing for sanctions against domestic 
and foreign entities that contribute to missile proliferation (see Speier, Chow, and Starr, 2001). 
In addition, there are United Nations Security Council sanctions, particularly against Iran and 
North Korea, that proscribe transfers of items in the MTCR Annex.
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Key MTCR Items Considered in This Study 
•  Category I: 
Item 1 – delivery systems (500 kg/300 km) 
 1.A.1. rockets 
 1.A.2. unmanned aerial vehicles 
Item 2 – complete subsystems for Item 1: 
 2.A.1.a. individual stages 
 2.A.1.b. RVs and their equipment 
 2.A.1.c. rocket motors and engines 
 2.A.1.d. guidance sets 
 2.A.1.e. thrust vector controls 
 2.A.1.f. safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms 
13 
As noted in slide 13, the MTCR applies its restrictive Category I controls to two classes of 
complete delivery systems: rockets and UAVs above a specifi ed capability threshold.
Th e MTCR also applies Category I controls to six classes of complete subsystems (Item 
2.A set in slide 13) that can readily contribute to Category I delivery vehicles. Of these, some 
penaid-relevant items could be listed in an expansion of Item 2.A.1.b, which controls re-entry 
vehicles (RVs) and their equipment.
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14  /2010!
Key MTCR Items Considered in This Study 
(Cont’d) 
•  Category II: 
Item 4 – propellants and chemicals 
Items 5, 7, and 8 – reserved for future use 
Item 6 – structural materials 
Item 10 – flight control 
Item 11 – avionics 
Item 15 – test facilities and equipment 
Item 16 – modeling-simulation and design integration 
Item 17 – stealth 
Item 18 – nuclear effects protection 
14 
Th e MTCR’s less-restrictive Category II list consists of 15 classes of items and three open 
items (“reserved for future use”), which included hardware and technology that were later 
recategorized. 
Th e Category II classes of items listed in slide 14, including the open items, are possible 
sites for listing some penaid items and their technology.
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15  /2010!
Items Also Covered by the MTCR 





Each hardware item listed in the MTCR Annex is generally accompanied by a list of related 
items shown in slide 15. In particular, design and production technology is treated at least as 
restrictively as the hardware item itself.
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16  /2010!
Penaid Subsystems Potentially Covered by 
the Current MTCR 
•  Re-entry vehicles 
•  Stealth 
•  Nuclear effects protection 
16 
It can be argued that the current (October 23, 2012) version of the MTCR Annex can be inter-
preted to cover some penaid technologies discussed in this report.
For example, in Category I, re-entry vehicles and their equipment are described as follows: 
[Item 2.A.1.b] “Re-entry vehicles, and equipment designed or modifi ed therefor . . [includ-
ing] 1. Heat shields, and components therefor. . . 2 . Heat sinks and components therefor 
. . . 3. Electronic equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles.” [Th e text represented 
by ellipses specifi es usability for rockets with a 500 kg/300 km capability and exceptions 
for non-weapon payloads.]
On the one hand, it could be argued that any penaid subsystem carried by an RV is auto-
matically covered by the current MTCR. But this is not obvious to some offi  cials who imple-
ment the MTCR. And such phrases as “designed or modifi ed therefor” leave open the question 
of whether “therefor” applies to equipment carried by the RV but not essential to its operation. 
In this report, we specify penaid items that need to be covered. If they are not clearly covered 
by the current MTCR, then it is worth considering whether to make their coverage explicit.
In Category II, some penaid technologies are arguably covered as stealth or nuclear eff ects 
protection. Th e relevant language is as follows:
[Item 17.A.1] Devices for reduced observables such as radar refl ectivity, ultraviolet/infrared 
signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology). . . .
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[Item 18] Nuclear effects protection . . . [specifically] 18.A.1 “Radiation Hardened” “micro-
circuits” usable in protecting rocket systems . . . a gainst nuclear effects (e.g. Electromag-
netic Pulse [EMP], X-rays, combined blast and thermal effects) . . . 1 8.A.2. “Detectors” 
specially designed or modified to protect rocket systems . . . a gainst nuclear effects . . .  
18.A.3. Radomes designed to withstand a c ombined thermal shock greater than . . .  
accompanied by a peak over pressure of greater than . . . usable in protecting rocket systems 
. . . against nuclear effects. . . .
Once again, there is the question of making explicit those additional stealth items that 
need to be covered. And, with Item 18, there is currently no mention of penaid hardening tech-
nologies to protect against non-nuclear effects.
Early in the MTCR Annex, there is a series of definitions. In the annex, the definition of 
payload includes countermeasures equipment and post-boost vehicles. However, this definition 
does not constitute a control list. The purpose of the definition is to standardize the calculation 




Items Proposed for Category I
17  /2010!
Definitions 
•  Penaid – In this report, countermeasures carried on an 
attacker’s ballistic missile to defeat missile defenses 
•  Space-qualified – Capable of surviving the launch, space, 
and/or re-entry environments 
•  Electromagnetic spectrum – The full radiofrequency, 
infrared, optical, and ultraviolet spectra 
17 
Slide 17 defi nes terms used frequently in this report. When these terms are used, they are 
meant with the defi nitions shown.
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18  /2010!
Penaids: Possible Category I Items 
Missile-borne countermeasure subsystems, and 
penetration aids designed to saturate, confuse, evade, or 
suppress missile defenses and designed or modified for 
rocket systems capable of delivering at least a 500 kg 
payload to a range of at least 300 km, including . . . 
18 
Th e text in slide 18 applies to all candidate Category I items discussed in this report.
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19  /2010!
Complete Penaids 
•  Complete, integrated, missile-borne countermeasure 
subsystems 
•  Issue 
–  MTCR Item 2 (complete subsystems) 
19 
Th e most obvious Category I candidate is a complete penaid subsystem. Th e obvious place for 
it on the MTCR Annex is Item 2, complete subsystems.
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20  /2010!
Complete Penaids (Cont’d) 
 
Source: Brian Burnell, “Chevaline Deployment Sequence–Mod,” Wikipedia, last modified December 30, 2011, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Chevaline_deployment_sequence-mod.gif.  
20 
Heat shield to protect 
against nose cone eject 
rocket exhaust and exit 
heating.
Equipment section and 
second-stage booster.
Second-stage booster 















PAC manFuvers to all attJUVdes using four intermittent hot-gas 
jets (A) and moves using liquid-fuel rockets (B) to disperse long 
and short-throw decoys, spool-chaff and other penaids into a predetermined 
‘Threat-tube’ 150 miles long surrounding the ReBs and warheads, and the ReB 
‘disguise’ deploys to match ReB radar image to the decoys.
Relieved of PAC and ReB 
weight, the second-stage 
booster still ring, accelerates 
past the PAC and ReB-C.
Nose cone ejection.
Heating caused by 
aerodynamic drag 
when leaving the up-
per atmosphere after 
nose cone ejection is 
known as exit heating.
Th is report includes illustrations—prepared by RAND or available online—of some of the 
items suggested for MTCR controls. For example, as depicted in slide 20, the British Cheva-
line countermeasure subsystem contains many components that must be operated in a strictly 
choreographed manner.
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Test Targets 
•  Complete subsystems for missile defense test targets 
designed to appear like RVs or countermeasures to 
missile defense sensors 
•  Issues 
–  Affects missile defense cooperation. May require 
testing in supplier nation or supplier retaining 
jurisdiction or control of test targets until launch.  
–  MTCR Item 2 (complete subsystems) 
21 
Missile defense test targets simulate off ensive missiles, RVs, or penaids. Th ey are used in exer-
cises of missile defense sensor and interceptor systems. Such targets create a number of prolif-
eration problems. Th eir technologies may be indistinguishable from—or, at least, interchange-
able with—those of penaids. At a minimum, their development and testing off er a perfect 
cover for the development and testing of penaids themselves. Consequently, they would appro-
priately be treated in the MTCR identically to complete penaids by being included in Item 2 
of the MTCR Annex.
However, there is much legitimate international cooperation in missile defense. And mis-
sile defense capabilities do need to be tested against realistic targets. How can international 
cooperation occur if participants do not share test targets and their technology?
Th ere are at least three possibilities for resolving this dilemma, all of which have prec-
edents in nonproliferation practice. One is for nations receiving missile defenses to develop 
their own test targets. Th is has the disadvantage of permitting the development of penaid tech-
nology. A second possibility would involve allowing the recipient nation to conduct testing on 
the supplier’s territory to avoid having the supplier export the test targets. Th is would have the 
additional advantage of not requiring the recipient of missile defense equipment to develop its 
own targets and infrastructure. A third possibility would have the supplier of test targets pro-
vide them under conditions permitted by the MTCR, with the supplier retaining jurisdiction 
or control of the items until they are launched. Th is alternative would prevent the test target 
or its technology from passing to the tester of the missile defenses while still allowing realistic 
testing on the recipient’s territory.
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22  /2010!
 
“L’Garde’s first project was the Inflatable Exoatmospheric Object (IEO) in 1971. The most heavily 
instrumented inflatable target L’Garde has designed, tested, and flown was the Firefly. The firefly was 
instrumented to detect and change its state of motion through an on-board microprocessor and a 
L’Garde-developed lightweight coning-control system. Other targets and countermeasures objects include 
the (a) multi-balloon canister, (b) sounding rocket measurements program (SRMP) objects, (c) light 
replica decoy (LREP), (d) dual-decoy technology (DDT), and the (e) thrusted replica decoy (TREP).” 
Source: L’Garde, Inc., “Missile Defense Targets and Countermeasures,” web page, undated(b),  
http://www.lgarde.com/programs/missile-defense-targets-and-countermeasures. Used with permission. 
22 
Test Targets (Cont’d) 
U.S. Test Targets 
Slide 22 provides another example of penaid-related information that is available online. 
L’Garde, Inc., was founded in 1971 in Orange County, California, to support ballistic missile 
defense through the development and manufacture of infl atable targets and decoy systems. It 
has exported some of these items.
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23  /2010!
Test Targets (Cont’d) 
U.S. Test Targets 





“The COOP was an MDA (Missile Defense Agency) supported project through AFRL [Air Force 
Research Laboratory]. Its objective was to develop calibrated orbiting objects for use in research into 
technologies necessary to build relatively inexpensive microsatellites for test and calibration of the U.S. 
ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) sensors. The first COOP was designed to simulate reentry 
vehicle motion and dynamics using the spacecraft attitude control system.” 
Source: L’Garde, Inc., “The Calibrated Orbiting Objects Project (COOP),” web page, undated(a),  
http://www.lgarde.com/programs/missile-defense-targets-and-countermeasures/coop. Used with permission. 
23 
As indicated in slide 23, the Calibrated Orbiting Objects Project developed test targets for the 
Missile Defense Agency. Test targets can be sophisticated, reproducing the behavior of RVs or 
decoys.
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24  /2010!
Boost-Glide Vehicles 
•  Ballistically boosted glide vehicles designed to use 
aerodynamic forces to control their trajectory and their 
specially designed subsystems (including their thermal 
protection subsystems); to be treated as RVs and their 
subsystems 
•  Issues 
–  Specially designed? 
–  Do not include as Item 2.A.1.a (individual rocket 
stages) because not powered? 
–  Include as note to Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles) 
“specially designed” – necessary in view of Item 2 
note allowing Category II treatment for peaceful 
spacecraft? 
24 
Unpowered boost-glide vehicles can function as RVs that do not follow a ballistic trajectory. 
For this reason, they are more diffi  cult to track and intercept, and they can maneuver to 
defeat missile defenses. Although they may or may not leave the atmosphere—and thus may 
not strictly “re-enter”—they can appropriately be subject to the same treatment as RVs in the 
MTCR Annex. However, the re-entry of peaceful spacecraft is controlled by the same tech-
nologies, again raising the issue of “specially designed” or an exemption for peaceful spacecraft 
that already applies to RVs in the MTCR Annex.
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Boost-Glide Vehicles (Cont’d) 
Boost-Glide Vehicle Concept 
Source: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Hypersonic Aircraft Ready for Launch,” press release, August 9, 
2011, http://www.darpa.mil/newsevents/releases/2011/2011/08/09_hypersonic_aircraft_ready_for_launch.aspx. 
25 





Items Proposed for Category I but Possible Inclusions in 
Category II
26  /2010!
Category I or Category II? 
•  Recommendations listed in separate sections 
•  Reluctance to overload Category I 
•  Option to include in Item 5 (currently an open item) 
•  Include items in both Categories I and II? 
26 
Th is chapter discusses ten items that are specifi cally applicable to penaids and, therefore, pro-
posed for inclusion in Category I, Item 2. 
Th ere may be a reluctance to widen the strict restrictions of Category I to a large number 
of additional items. For that reason, this report acknowledges the possibility of placing the 
items under the case-by-case review provisions of Category II. Because these ten items are 
lower-level subsystems than the three items discussed in the previous chapter, they could argu-
ably be placed into either category. For each of these ten items, we identify possible locations 
in Category II. An obvious possibility is to place many of them in Category II, Item 5. After a 
reorganization of the MTCR Annex, some items became open; Item 5 is the fi rst class of items 
to be open.
34    Penaid Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of Countermeasures Against Ballistic Missile Defenses
The MTCR Annex includes different versions of some items in both Categories I and II. 
Item 19.A.1 (Category II) specifies rocket systems of any payload with a range capability of 
300 km. Subsystems of such rockets—individual rocket stages and rocket motors or engines—
are covered in Item 20.A.1. All of these items are downsized versions of Category I items. They 
are included to control lower-payload missile variants that could deliver chemical or biological 
agents. Similarly, some items proposed in this report for Category I, such as complete penaid 
subsystems or missile defense test targets, could be “mirrored” in the Category II controls 
when they are usable in rocket systems with less than a 500 kg payload capability but with a 
300 km range capability.
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27  /2010!
Canisters/Dispensers 
•  Penetration aid packing and/or deployment mechanisms 
•  Issues 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and 
equipment designed or modified therefor)? 
–  Not a complete penaid; it might be deemed less 
sensitive because it must be combined with other 
items to create a complete penaid. Include in Item 5 
(open item) to avoid overloading Category I? 
27 
Below the level of complete countermeasure subsystems or test targets, there are some new 
possibilities for MTCR controls. One is to include the new items in Category I, but as a 
subset of the RV items. Th is would allow a number of penaid-related items to be added to the 
Category I l ist without greatly enlarging the main number of technology classes covered by 
Category I.
Another possibility is to avoid overloading Category I by creating a new Category II 
penaid item in the MTCR Annex, using one of the item classes reserved for future use.
Because penaids must be c arefully deployed in space, their canisters or dispensers are 
sophisticated items that warrant inclusion somewhere in the annex.
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Canisters/Dispensers (Cont’d) 
Decoy Canister and Internals 
Firefly Canister Firefly Canister 
The internals of Firefly Firefly inflated 
Source: Historical images available through GlobalSecurity.org, “Decoys,” web page, last updated July 21, 2011, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/decoys.htm. 
28 
One type of canister, for the Firefl y, is depicted in slide 28. It was developed decades ago.
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29  /2010!
Post-Boost Subsystems 
•  Post-boost subsystems providing attitude control or 
maneuvering capabilities and specially designed for RVs 
or countermeasure subsystems 
•  Issues 
–  Without “specially designed,” how to distinguish from 
satellite systems? 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.a (individual rocket stages)? 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and 
equipment designed or modified therefor)? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) or Item 10 (flight control) 
to avoid overloading Category I? 
29 
In conjunction with canisters and dispensers, post-boost subsystems, which contain small pro-
pulsion subsystems, are used to adjust the velocity vector of RVs and penaids. 
Th e problem is that such subsystems can also be used to deploy satellites. Th e contro-
versial term specially designed may need to be used to specify post-boost subsystems uniquely 
designed for RVs and penaids.
Such subsystems could be included under either of two possible Category I items on the 
MTCR Annex, or they could be included in two possible places in Category II.
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30  /2010!
Post-Boost Subsystems (Cont’d) 
Post-Boost Subsystem 
Source: Adapted from Karl Tate, “How Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles Work (Infographic),” Space.com, 
February 1, 2013, http://www.space.com/19601-how-intercontinental-ballistic-missiles-work-infographic.html. 
30 
A post-boost vehicle, sometimes called a stage, tends to be a s hort cylinder containing low-
thrust rocket engines and placed between the missile’s fi nal boosting stage and the re-entry 
vehicle(s) and penaid package. 
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31  /2010!
Replicas/Decoys 
•  RV replicas or decoys 
•  Issue 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and 
equipment designed or modified therefor)? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) to avoid overloading 
Category I? 
31 
Items designed to appear to be RVs can be developed as test targets (see slide 22) or developed 
uniquely as decoy countermeasures.
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32  /2010!
Electronic Countermeasures 
•  Powered devices for electronic warfare (EW) against missile defense systems 
in any part of the electromagnetic spectrum — including electromagnetic 
jammers or signal spoofers, anti-jam subsystems, high-power microwave 
sources, and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse sources capable of 
operating in space or re-entry environments 
•  Issues 
–  Too specific? 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or 
modified therefor)? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) or Item 11 (avionics) to avoid overloading 
Category I? 
32 
A variety of electronic countermeasures are appropriate for inclusion in the MTCR Annex. 
Th ere is a fi ne line to be walked to avoid being too specifi c about such items. However, it is 
important to control penaids over the entire electromagnetic spectrum, as well as both items 
that generate broad blasts of electromagnetic energy and items that generate fi nely tuned sig-
nals to spoof missile defenses.
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Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
Directional Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCMs) 
 
The DIRCM subsystem uses lasers 
to jam a missile infrared seeker 
through its aperture. The intended 
effect is to confuse the missile 
guidance and cause it to veer off 
its intercept trajectory.  
 
J-Music DIRCM Subsystem 
(Height less than 30 cm) 
Source: Promotional product image from Elbit Systems. 
33 
DIRCMs can be used on aircraft or missiles to protect them from attack by weapons employ-
ing infrared seekers. If the DIRCMs are space-qualifi ed, they could be included in Category I.
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34  /2010!
Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) Jammer 
 
DRFM jammers are used to jam or 
spoof missile defense radars. 
They are designed to digitize an 
intercepted radio-frequency 
signal, then retransmit it to jam the 
transmitting radar, create a false 
target, or modify the target 
characteristics, thereby reducing 
the effectiveness of the missile 
defense system. 
 ADEP-800/1 DRFM Jammer (Length less than 30 cm) 
Source: Promotional product image from Systems and Processes Engineering Corporation, “ADEP™-800/1 
DRFM Jammers Delivered to U.S. Army by Systems and Processes Engineering Corporation,” press release, 
July 28, 2009, http://www.spec.com/content/view/68. 
34 
Space-qualifi ed DRFM jammers can be used to counter the radars of missile defense systems.
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35  /2010!
Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
Low-Power Jammer 
 
“. . . missile attackers can employ low-power  
jammers (right), pieces of hardware not much  
larger than a dime, to generate tens of  
thousands of false targets to mask a  
warhead’s presence or location.” 
 
Source: Quote and historical photo from George N. Lewis and and Theodore A. Postol, “The European 
Missile Defense Folly,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 2, May 2008. 
35 
Large numbers of electronic penaids can be carried in a relatively small payload.
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36  /2010!
Electronic Countermeasures (Cont’d) 
Ukrainian Electromagnetic Pulse and High-Power Microwave Generators 
“Magnetocumulative generators (MCG) of electric pulses are 
based on conversion of explosion energy into that of 
electric pulses. Owing to the high energy capacity of 
modern explosives, the magnetocumulative generators of  
today have pretty small dimensions and low weight and are 
capable of generating electric pulses that carry currents as  
high as hundreds of mega-amperes and produce energies 
up to 100 MJ, their power being as high as 1013 W.” 
General view of high-power spiral MCG 
(Length approximately 0.5 m) 
General view of beamless coaxial generator MG1 
with connected capacitor storage 
(Length less than 0.5 m) 
 
“High-power pulsed beamless microwave 
generator MG-1 is designed for 
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) studies 
in the laboratory and field conditions.” 
Source: Institute for Electromagnetic Research, http://iemr.com.ua (click “Products”). Used with permission. 
36 
A Ukrainian fi rm, the Institute for Electromagnetic Research, develops items incorporating 
possible penaid technology. Th e institute’s website does not specifi cally cite countermeasures as 
applications for these items.
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37  /2010!
Chaff/Obscurants/Flares 
•  Chaff, obscurants, or flares, and their dispensers, designed to 
operate in space or re-entry environments, including 
–  Flares, containing both fuel and oxidizer, with space-qualified 
igniters 
–  Passive radio frequency or optical chaff 
•  Issues 
–  Specify “dispensers” separately from canister/dispenser item 
above? 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and equipment designed 
or modified therefor)? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) to avoid overloading Category I? 
37 
Various kinds of obscurants can generate optical or radio frequency signals to hide an RV. 
Obscurants require specialized dispensers.
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Chaff/Obscurants/Flares (Cont’d) 
Ukrainian Chaff and Chaff Dispensers 
Photographic image of one of the types of 
dedicated shape radiolocation reflectors 
General view of mechanical system of dispersal of 
dedicated shape radiolocation reflectors 
38 
Source: Institute for Electromagnetic Research, http://iemr.com.ua (click “Products”). Used with permission. 
As indicated in slide 38, the Institute for Electromagnetic Research has developed chaff  for use 
in the upper or lower atmosphere, as well as associated dispensers.
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RV/Decoy Signature Control 
•  Mechanisms or specially designed materials for the 
control of RV or decoy signatures 
•  Issues 
–  “Specially designed” necessary for “materials”? 
–  Include “mechanisms” in Item 2.A.1.b  
(re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or 
modified therefor)? 
–  Are materials already adequately covered in  
Item 17.C.1 (materials for reduced observables)? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) to avoid overloading 
Category I? 
39 
An RV or a decoy can have its signature adjusted to hide it or to increase its visibility in vari-
ous spectra.
Mechanisms to accomplish this are obvious candidates for the MTCR Annex. However, 
materials are a more diffi  cult matter. Materials are often dual-use. Th erefore, it may be neces-
sary to introduce “specially designed” into their description. If the materials are to be treated 
as Category II, they could be included under the annex’s current provision for stealthy materi-
als. Th is is Item 17.C.1, “materials for reduced observables such as radar refl ectivity, ultraviolet/
infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e., stealth technology).” Th e MTCR makes an 
exception for “coatings (including paints) when specially used for thermal control of satellites.” 
Th is item does not currently include materials for increased observables.
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RV/Decoy Signature Control (Cont’d) 
RV Signature Control Concept 
Source: Adapted from “Missile Defense 101—ICBM Fundamentals,” Steeljaw Scribe, May 9, 2007,  
http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007/05/missile-defense-101-icbm-fundamentals.html. 
40 
One signature-control concept, shown in slide 40, would lower the temperature of the RV sur-
face to reduce its infrared visibility.
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RV/Decoy Signature Control (Cont’d) 
Antisimulation Concept 
 
Source: Adapted from Missile Defense Agency illustrations by Alfred T. Kamajian,  










Decoy balloons are 
of various sizes, 
temperatures, and 
reflectivities. 
Another signature-control concept would disguise the RV to look like a nonlethal object, such 
as a decoy.
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Plume Signature Control 
•  Mechanisms or specially designed materials to control the 
signature of propellant plumes 
•  Issues 
–  “Specially designed” necessary for “materials”? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) to avoid overloading 
Category I? 
42 
Countermeasures can also include eff orts to obscure the signature of rocket propellant plumes. 
Again, there is the issue of whether to use “specially designed” with regard to materials.
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Wake Modification 
•  Mechanisms or specially designed materials for the 
control of RV wake signatures 
•  Issues 
–  “Specially designed” necessary for “materials”? 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and 
equipment designed or modified therefor)? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) to avoid overloading 
Category I? 
43 
On re-entry, the wake of an RV can reveal its location, enabling it to be targeted by terminal 
missile defenses. Th e inclusion of wake modifi cation items in the MTCR Annex would raise 
the usual “specially designed” problem of how to handle materials.
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Maneuvering Subsystems 
•  Specially designed subsystems for RVs that enable 
maneuvering 
•  Issues 
–  “Specially designed” necessary to avoid subsystems 
for peaceful spacecraft? 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and 
equipment designed or modified therefor)? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) or Item 10 (flight control) 
to avoid overloading Category I? 
44 
Maneuvering RVs—exoatmospheric or endoatmospheric—can evade missile defenses. How-
ever, thrusted, exoatmospheric maneuvering subsystems are also used for the fl ight control of 
peaceful spacecraft. Th us, “specially designed” again becomes an issue. Likewise, aerodynamic 
and/or endoatmospheric maneuvering systems would seem to raise the “specially designed” 
issue. Note that complete RVs are already included in Category 1 of the annex, so this item 
applies only to subsystems for RVs.
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Submunitions 
•  Missile submunitions specially designed for the 
delivery of liquids, gases, or powders 
Issues 
–  “For the delivery of liquids, gases, or powders” 
necessary for chemical or biological agents? 
–  Include in Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and 
equipment designed or modified therefor)? 
–  Leave for chemical/biological nonproliferation 
regimes? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item)? 
45 
Submunitions, large numbers of small space-qualifi ed payloads released from a missile, can 
serve as penaids by multiplying the number of targets confronting a missile defense. Because 
the MTCR is explicitly directed against the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering 
WMD, it could logically restrict submunitions capable of delivering chemical or biological 
agents.1 
However, a submunition subsystem for chemical or biological delivery is arguably already 
restricted by international export controls on chemical and biological weapons. Given this con-
sideration, submunitions might not need to be added to the MTCR.
Th ere are also submunitions for the delivery of conventional, high-explosive payloads 
for cratering runways or large-area attacks against personnel or vehicles. However, these fall 
outside the realm of WMD and, therefore, outside the controls of the MTCR. Th ey might, 
however, be c overed by the international Wassenaar Arrangement, which covers exports of 
conventional weapons but is less restrictive than the MTCR. 
1 Nuclear warheads may be delivered by multiple re-entry vehicles, but they are generally regarded as too massive to be 
released in very large numbers (i.e., more than 15 or so) from a single missile. Missiles for delivering radiological agents are 
not explicitly targeted by the MTCR guidelines.
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46  /2010!
Submunitions (Cont’d) 
U.S. cluster warhead, circa 1960 
Sources: U.S. Army photo, in “Demonstration Cluster Bomb,” Wikipedia, last updated March 27, 2009,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Demonstration_cluster_bomb.jpg. 
46 
Slide 46 illustrates chemical submunitions carried by a short-range U.S. missile in the 1960 
period. As a result of international arms-control undertakings, the United States no longer pos-
sesses biological weapons and is destroying its chemical weapon stocks. 
55
CHAPTER FIVE
Items Proposed for Category II
47  /2010!
Penaids: Possible Category II Items 
These items have alternative uses that should not 
necessarily be as tightly restricted as Category I items. The 
items can be used for satellites or missile defenses 
themselves.  
47 
Th e items addressed in this chapter are clearly dual-use and therefore appropriate for 
Category II.
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48  /2010!
Multiple-Object Deployment 
•  Items, other than the specially designed post-boost 
subsystems described for Category I, for the automatic or 
remotely controlled ejection or deployment of multiple 
flight objects in space except when incorporated in 
satellites 
•  Issues 
–  How to distinguish from penaid post-boost 
subsystems? 
–  Exempt “when incorporated in satellites” to conform 
to other MTCR exemptions? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) or Item 10 (flight 
control)? 
48 
Penaids can consist of many objects, including decoys, jammers, chaff , and fl ares. Special 
mechanisms, such as canisters attached to post-boost vehicles, deploy these objects appropri-
ately. However, similar mechanisms are used to deploy multiple satellites from a single rocket. 
Consideration must thus be given to exempting mechanisms that are not “specially designed” 
as penaid post-boost vehicles. Th e MTCR already includes exemptions for satellite items, and 
this type of exemption might be used here.
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49  /2010!
Inflation/Assembly Items 
•  Items for the automatic or remotely controlled inflation or 
assembly of objects in space, except when incorporated 
in satellites 
•  Issues 
–  Exempt “when incorporated in satellites” to conform 
to other MTCR exemptions? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item)? 
49 
Test targets can be balloons or decoys that require infl ation or other forms of automatic assem-
bly in space. However, some satellites are balloons or otherwise involve automatic assembly, 
such as for solar panels. So, a satellite exemption may be appropriate.
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50  /2010!
Inflation/Assembly Items (Cont’d) 
NASA Inflatable Re-Entry Shield 
Source: NASA photo by Kathy Barnsdorf, in Leonard David, “NASA Launching High-Tech Inflatable Heat Shield Test 
Monday,” Space.com, July 17, 2012, http://www.space.com/16615-nasa-inflatable-heat-shield-launching-saturday.html.  
50 
A recent example of an infl ated space object is a National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) re-entry heat shield, tested in July 2012.
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51  /2010!
Hardening 
•  Items specially designed for hardening against thermal 
radiation, non-nuclear electromagnetic pulses, or  
high-powered microwaves 
•  Issues 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) or Item 18 (nuclear 
effects protection), which already covers hardening 
against nuclear radiation pulses and nuclear 
“combined blast and thermal effects”? 
51 
Th e MTCR already includes items for hardening RVs against certain types of nuclear eff ects. 
However, it may be appropriate to add other forms of hardening against missile defenses.
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52  /2010!
Attack Warning Sensors 
•  Mechanisms to be carried on a missile-borne object to 
sense when it or a companion object is under attack 
•  Issues 
–  Include in Category II because item is usable in other 
systems, such as aircraft? 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) or Item 11 (avionics) to 
avoid overloading Category I? 
52 
RVs can wait for warning of missile defenses before deploying countermeasures. Th e warning 
systems are candidates for the MTCR Annex. However, such warning systems have applica-
tions other than ballistic missile countermeasures, so they are candidates for inclusion in Cat-
egory II.
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53  /2010!
Fly-Along Sensors 
•  Fly-along sensor packages 
•  Issues 
–  Item 5 (open item) or Item 15 (test facilities and 
equipment)? 
53 
One form of instrumentation for testing penaids is the fl y-along sensor, which is dispensed 
with the RV and its penaids and reports to a g round station on the penaids’ performance. 
However, such sensors can also report on satellite performance, thus making a Category II 
designation appropriate.
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54  /2010!
Test Facilities/Equipment 
•  Test facilities, test equipment, and diagnostic  
(e.g., measuring and calibration) equipment usable for 
controlled items, including 
–  Vacuum chambers suitable for the drop testing of 
controlled items 
–  Signature measurement chambers 
•  Issues 
–  Include in Item 5 (open item) or Item 15 (test facilities 
and equipment)? 
–  Distribute among specific items or place in Item 5? 
54 
Other types of test instrumentation and facilities are usable for both penaids and satellite 
development or microgravity research.
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55  /2010!
Test Facilities/Equipment (Cont’d) 
German and U.S. Vacuum Drop Towers 
Bremen drop tower NASA drop tower. View of free fall in vacuum chamber 
Sources: “Fallturm Bremen,” Wikipedia, last updated March 13, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallturm_Bremen; 
NASA, “Zero Gravity Research Facility,” web page, last updated September 28, 2011,  
https://rt.grc.nasa.gov/main/rlc/zero-gravity-research-facility. 
55 
A vacuum drop tower is used for the terrestrial testing of items, allowing them to experience 





Implementing Penaid Export Controls
56  /2010!
Implementation 
•  Review criteria 
•  Assessment of intent 
•  Risk of overloading 
•  Consensus requirements 
56 
Although penaid export controls present some defi nitional and structural issues, such issues are 
familiar matters in the implementation of the MTCR.
For example, the problem of individualizing the decisions on the export of dual-use items 
is broadly handled by the MTCR’s Category II list, which consists of items subject to case-by-
case review rather than a strong presumption of export denial. Category II items (and, indeed, 
all MTCR items) are reviewed by the following six criteria (see MTCR, undated, para. 3):
A. Concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
B. Th e capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the recipient state;
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C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of delivery systems 
(other than manned aircraft) for weapons of mass destruction;
D. The assessment of the end use of the transfers, including relevant assurances of the 
recipient states;
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements; 
F. The risk of controlled items falling into the hands of terrorist groups and individuals.
Some of these criteria involve tests of intent (e.g., “objectives,” “assessment of the end 
use,” “assurances”). Although many of the current objections to the use of “specially designed” 
are grounded in a preference for physical descriptions over estimates of intent, the MTCR is 
replete with the term specially designed and with criteria of intent. Similarly, countermeasure 
equipment usable for both aircraft and missiles (such as chaff and electronic jammers) or usable 
for both peaceful spacecraft and missiles (such as inflation/assembly items) can be reviewed for 
export with the above criteria.
Another concern, discussed at length earlier, is the possible negotiating burden if the 
MTCR—particularly the highly restrictive Category I list—is overloaded with up to 19 new 
items. However, new items can be n ested into the control definitions of larger items. For 
instance, MTCR Annex Item 2.A.1.b (re-entry vehicles and equipment designed or modi-
fied therefor), is not a single item. It already has sub-items: (1) heat shields, (2) heat sinks, and 
(3) electronic equipment specially designed for re-entry vehicles. More sub-items could be 
added to this list. Alternatively, a new Category I item 2.A.1.g could be added as “penetration 
aids” with sub-items suggested in this report for MTCR Item 2.
The greatest difficulty will be obtaining the support of key governments for penaid export 
controls. The five nations defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nuclear-armed 
states—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—all have sophisti-
cated penaid programs. Modifications to the MTCR require the consensus of all 34 members, 
including Russia but not China (which, as noted earlier, professes to observe a different form of 
the MTCR from the version currently in effect). The Congressional Commission on the Stra-
tegic Posture of the United States singled out Russia and China for special attention. Russia’s 
agreement is needed for an MTCR modification, and China’s support is needed if there is not 






Penaid export controls would help 
•  Missile nonproliferation 
•  Missile defense 
•  Deterrence 
 
But will Russia and China cooperate? 
57 
Th is research illustrates how the MTCR Annex can be modifi ed to provide better controls on 
missile defense penetration aids. If enacted, the MTCR modifi cations suggested here would 
constitute one of the most signifi cant adjustments to the regime since its inception in 1987. Th e 
recommended modifi cations, or some variant of them, would strengthen the regime’s ability 
to impede the spread of increasingly lethal ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD and 
penetrating missile defenses. 
Although policy considerations were beyond the scope of this research, moving a com-
plex regime modifi cation to fruition would obviously require careful diplomacy by the United 
States and like-minded governments. Several government offi  cials interviewed for this study 
believe such an eff ort would be worthwhile. Th e recommended MTCR revisions would rein-
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force the effectiveness of U.S. and allied missile defense systems, in turn bolstering protection 
and deterrence against missile-armed adversaries and enhancing international security. 
The largest outstanding question is not the value of restrictions on penaid exports. It is 
whether Russia and China will support such restrictions.
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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) becomes a greater threat when 
accompanied by the proliferation of effective means of delivery. As proliferator nations acquire 
ballistic missiles for this purpose, it will be important to establish effective measures to counter WMD 
attacks. But the beneﬁts will be lost or reduced if proliferators can acquire effective countermeasures 
against missile defenses. Such countermeasures, when incorporated in an attacker’s missile, are 
known as penetration aids, or penaids. This research was designed to assist U.S. agencies charged 
with generating policies to discourage the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missile delivery systems, 
thereby strengthening deterrence. Speciﬁcally, it recommends controls on potential exports of penaid-
related items according to the structure of the current international policy against the proliferation of 
missiles capable of delivering WMD, the Missile Technology Control Regime. The recommendations 
account for 19 classes of such items and are based on structured interviews with government and 
nongovernment experts, as well as an independent technical assessment to develop a preliminary 
characterization of the technologies and equipment most critical to the emerging penaid threat. The 
project also brought together a selected group of experts to participate in a workshop to review the 
initial characterization of penaid technologies and equipment.
